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Abstract:
Many issues have come before the Federal Communications Committee (FCC) in the last
year. Some actions were taken (as with particular mergers), some actions were postponed
(as with Universal Service Fund reform), and some issues are currently being tackled (the
National Broadband Strategic Plan). In this paper, we focus on the topic of the National
Broadband Plan, which the FCC is mandated to provide to Congress February 17, 2010,
the FCC Merger Review process, and the determination of optimal penalties for
violations of FCC rules or orders.

Revised version published as: Michelle Connolly and James E. Prieger
(2009), “Economics at the FCC, 2008-2009: Broadband and Merger
Review,” Review of Industrial Organization, Vol. 35, No. 4, 387-417. Please
cite published version.

I.

Broadband

Congress, and more recently, the Obama administration have been particularly interested
in the state of broadband in the United States. There is a strong sentiment that broadband
availability, speed, and usage are crucial to continued U.S. growth, innovation, and
welfare. There is also concern in some quarters, prompted in part by international
broadband rankings computed by the OECD that the U.S. is falling behind other
countries in the broadband race.1

There are four main questions that need to be

considered when determining broadband policy:

1. What is the current state of broadband deployment and adoption across the U.S.?
The data to date are lacking, and it is difficult to determine if and where actions might be
needed if we do not know exactly where there is a lack of broadband availability and
adoption.
2. What are the economic and social impacts of broadband? Knowing the actual
impact of broadband usage should guide policymakers on the potential benefits of any
policy interventions relative to the costs of any particular programs.

3. What are our goals? Given the presence of multiple goals set forth by Congress, what
are the priorities? Do we prioritize based on expected benefits or expected costs? Is
intervention is necessary to achieve these goals? If so, then

4. How do we best to achieve these goals? (What are the determinants of broadband
deployment and adoption?) Given what we know about drivers of deployment and

1

There are good reasons to think that the OECD methodology does not accurately portray the progress of
broadband deployment in the U.S. See Ford, Koutsky, and Spiwak (2007, 2008) and Wallsten (2008) for
discussion.
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adoption, what are likely to be the most fruitful interventions? Where are interventions
going to have the greatest impact relative to its cost?

We discuss these four questions in turn.

1. What is the current state of broadband deployment and adoption across the U.S.?

According to Form 477 data collected by the FCC, as of June 2008, 100% of US
zip codes have at least one broadband subscriber, where broadband service is defined as
having maximum speeds of at least 200kbps in at least one direction. Moreover, 98.2%
of all U.S. zip codes have three or more broadband providers with at least one broadband
subscriber in them. Chart 1 shows the evolution of these statistics from 2000 to 2008.2
We see a strong increase in numbers of providers present in at least a portion of a zip
code over these last eight years. Does this mean that broadband is available everywhere
in the U.S.? No. Since the old Form 477 only asked broadband providers if they have at
least one subscriber in a zip code, and zip codes can be very large, the old Form 477 data
are likely to overestimate the availability of broadband. Moreover, since the old Form
477 did not ask any information on total subscribers or on pricing, the data are not useful
for estimating total demand for broadband.
Still, in terms of historical data up to June of 2008, the old Form 477 data are the
best national data that are available. And there are some things that we can learn using
those data. Among the few advantages of the old data is the fact that since the form had
been in use over a significant period of time, respondents were able to provide fairly
accurate responses. Secondly, time series analysis of the data is possible.

2

Table A1 in the Appendix shows the exact zip code percentages from 2000 to 2008 by number of highspeed providers.
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Chart 1
Percentage of U.S. Zip Codes with High-Speed Lines in Service
(June of Each Year)
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Source: FCC (2009). Until 2005, only providers with 250 or more lines per state were required to file.

For example, Charts 2-4 present the old Form 477 data with respect to median
household income, population, and population density, respectively. We see in these
figures that for each annual cross-section more “desirable” zip codes have more
broadband providers and thus have experienced more entry, as predicted by standard IO
models such as Bresnahan and Reiss (1987). Zip codes with larger populations and
higher incomes have greater expected total demand, and those with higher population
density have lower deployment costs. Hence it is not surprising that such zip codes
would experience both earlier entry and greater entry. The charts also suggest that the
thresholds for entry in general are falling; the size of household income or population that
is needed to encourage a given amount of entry has been falling over time.
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Chart 2
Number of Broadband Providers in ZIP code
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Source: FCC Form 477.

Chart 3
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Population Density

Chart 4
Number of Broadband Providers in ZIP code
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In an attempt to improve the usefulness of the data being collected, in December
2008 the FCC began using a revised Form 477 questionnaire, which for simplicity we
will refer to here as the new Form 477. Two of the more important changes in the new
form are that it now asks for information at the level of the census tract which is a smaller
geographic area than a zip code, and it asks for the total number of subscribers in a tract.3
Both of these changes will yield more informative data and will give us a much improved
sense of the actual amount of broadband penetration. The new form additionally asks
information on the maximum speed offered to these subscribers.
These changes make the new Form 477 data far more informative and useful in
any serious analysis of the broadband market. There are still however some limitations:


The data are still based on subscribership, which is only a proxy for availability.

3

The Census Bureau of the U.S. Department of Commerce originally delineates a census tract as a
geographic area with an average of 4,000 individuals (approximately 1,500 housing units). Moreover,
when first delineated these tracts are “designed to be homogeneous with respect to population
characteristics, economic status, and living conditions.” The geographic size of a census tract varies based
on population density. Still, the largest a Census tract is allowed to be is a full county. Tracts usually have
between 2,500 and 8,000 persons. “Census tract boundaries are delineated with the intention of being
maintained over a long time so that statistical comparisons can be made from census to census. However,
physical changes in street patterns caused by highway construction, new development, etc., may require
occasional revisions; census tracts occasionally are split due to large population growth, or combined as a
result of substantial population decline.” http://www.census.gov/geo/www/cen_tract.html
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Census tracts can still be quite large in rural areas.

Census blocks4 are

subdivisions of census tracts and would give more granular data. These block
level data would not only be more useful for economic analysis, but would also be
more informative for the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (NTIA) and the Rural Utilities Service (RUS) grant process.


Initial passes at the first round data suggest that too many speed blocks have been
included in the questionnaire. Combined with the fact that this question is new to
the providers, the speed data appear at first pass to be rather unreliable.



The newness of the questions in general means that it will take a few rounds
before respondents become sufficiently familiar with the information being
requested to organize their internal data and respond accurately.



Form 477 still does not ask what prices subscribers are paying for their broadband
services. Future consumer surveys (including that of the FCC) may ask this
question, but with bundling, consumers are often uncertain what portion of their
overall bill is for broadband service. Hence, asking the providers would yield
more accurate pricing data.



There is still no formal enforcement or penalties for firms who either do not
provide data or provide clearly inaccurate data.

Given the previous lack of disaggregated data on the availability of broadband in
the U. S., Congress passed the Broadband Data Improvement Act (47 U.S.C. 1301 note)
in October 2008.

This Act places requirements on several government offices and

agencies. Here we focus on the three main requirements that fall under the purview of
the FCC.
First, the FCC is required annually to compile information on unserved areas.
The FCC must match this information with Census Bureau data to determine the
population, population density, and average per capita income for these unserved areas.
The act allows the FCC to determine how to define an unserved area. Second, the FCC
must collect data on transmission speeds and prices of broadband service in a total of 75
4

A census block is a subdivision of a census tract and is the smallest geographic unit for which the Census
Bureau does 100 percent surveys, as opposed to sampling.
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communities in at least 25 countries. Third, the FCC must conduct periodic consumer
surveys of residential consumers, large businesses, and small businesses in urban,
suburban, and rural areas. The surveys are being designed to collect information on


The broadband technologies to which consumers subscribe.



How much consumers pay for their subscriptions.



The data transmission speeds of their subscriptions.



The types of applications and services that consumers use most often that require
broadband.



Other locations or means of accessing broadband that are used regularly by
consumers. 5

As part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Congress
passed the Broadband Technology Opportunities Program. In a later section we discuss
the goals of the program. Here we simply want to mention that part of the Program is to
require and fund a national mapping of broadband availability in the U.S.

2. What are the economic and social impacts of broadband?

There is a substantial amount of empirical evidence that suggests positive effects
of information communication technology on labor productivity and on growth of per
capital gross domestic product (GDP). More disaggregated studies suggest that these
observed aggregate effects are specific to particular communities and industries. In other
words, the observed positive effects of broadband appear to occur in particular industries
and/or communities with specific traits and do not appear to lead to productivity and
growth effects in other industries/communities. From the consumer side, gains are not
region-specific, but are likely affected by network effects.

Review of Academic Literature on Broadband

5

122 Stat 4096, p. 2-3.
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It is a widely held belief that access to broadband is crucial for individuals, firms,
and nations. Beyond the general intuition that broadband matters, there is an existing
literature that is relevant in the discussion of: 1) the importance of broadband to a
nation‟s economy, 2) the effects of broadband on employment, 3) the linkage of these
growth effects to specific geographic areas within a country, and 4) the value of
broadband to consumers (Intern-based telephony, retail, gaming, entertainment, job
searches, networking (social and professional), access to government services, etc.)
Aggregate Growth Effects of Broadband.
While we are inherently interested in the productivity effects of broadband, much
of the existing literature has focused on information communications technology more
generally. In part this is due to the fact that growth estimates need a reasonable number
of years of data in order to separate trend growth effects from business cycle fluctuations.
For example, Roller and Waverman (2001) consider the impact of telecommunications
infrastructure investments on GDP growth in 21 OECD countries from 1970 to 1990.
They find that one third of the per capita growth they measured during this time period
could be attributed to telephony investments. Moreover, they find strong evidence of
network externalities. When they separated countries into groups according to telephony
penetration rates, those with currently high (greater than 40%) penetration rates gained
the most from further investments. The marginal gains for these countries were more
than twice that for countries with low- or mid-level penetration rates.6
Using a different methodology, Jorgenson (2001) estimates that information
technology (IT) added 1.18% points to total GDP growth in the U.S. during the second
half of the 1990s. This is particularly impressive given that at the time information
technology assets were less than 5% of the capital stock. Jorgenson further estimates that
in the second half of the 1990s, two-thirds of total factor productivity growth and
approximately two-thirds of average labor productivity growth is attributable to a
combination of IT capital deepening and IT productivity growth. Similarly, Oliner and
Sichel (2000) estimate that IT contributed to 56% of labor productivity growth in the U.S.
6

Waverman, Meschi, and Fuss (2005) find that for low income countries, 10 percent higher mobile phone
penetration rates were associated with 0.59 percent higher growth.
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from 1996 to 1999. Of particular interest is Stiroh‟s (2002) finding that IT-producing and
IT-using industries were fully responsible for the large increase in U.S. aggregate
productivity from 1995-2000 relative to the 1987-1995 period.7
Using more recent data, Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2008) estimate that
Information Communications Technology (ICT) contributed to 59% of labor productivity
growth from 1995 to 2000 and 38% of labor productivity growth from 2000 to 2006.
Although the contribution of IT to further productivity growth does appear to be
decreasing, it is nonetheless still substantial.

Employment Effects of broadband

Communities are particularly interested in the relationship between broadband
availability and employment growth. There has been mixed evidence on this. Using the
old Form 477 data, Gillett, Lehr, Osorio, and Sirbu (2006) find that communities with
broadband in 1999 experienced faster job and firm growth from 1998-2002 and had
higher rental rates in 2000 than did communities without broadband. Using the same
data, Tolko (2008) also found positive correlations between broadband service and both
employment and the number of establishments in California zip codes. However, Tolko
found that the direction of causality may be from economic growth to broadband
availability since the growth seems to have preceded broadband availability in California.

Industry- and/or Community-Specific Growth Effects of Broadband

More disaggregated data studies appear to reveal differences in the growth and
productivity effects of broadband on different community types. A multitude of papers
find a link between local skills, or types of work and workers, or intensity of ICT usage
and positive gains from ICT.8 This literature echoes work on skill-biased technological

7

Other papers demonstrating positive effects of ICT include Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2003), Bloom, Sadun,
and Van Reenen (2007), and Greenstein and Spiller (1995).
8
Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2002), Autor (2001), Corali and Van Reenen (2001), Beaudry, Doms,
and Lewis (2006), Kolko (1999, 2002), Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003), Byrnjolffson and Yang (1997),
Koellinger (2006), and Yildmaz and Dinc (2002). Jorgenson, Ho, Samuels, and Stiroh (2007) estimate that
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change, whereby technological innovations that require skilled labor lead to increased
wage gaps between skilled and unskilled labor.
Forman, Goldfarb, and Greenstein (2009) analyze the use of “advanced Internet
technology” by businesses and wage growth from 1995 to 2000 by county in the U.S.9
They find that the use of advanced Internet technology is only associated with wage
growth in 180 counties that were, as of 1990, already well off in terms of income (top
quartile), education (top quartile), population (over 100,000), and fraction of firms in ITintensive industries (top quartile). There was no evidence of impact in rural areas.
Hence, advanced Internet technology can explain only one percent of wage growth for
the average county, but it does explain one quarter of the differences in wage growth
between well-off counties and others. One insight of this paper that is particularly
interesting is that the observed gains were not limited to counties with technology
production agglomeration. Instead, high-skill counties must also have high population,
income, and particular industry composition to gain from advanced Internet technology
use.10

Value to Consumer

There are many ways in which broadband can be useful to consumers. Using
Voice over Internet protocol (VOIP), broadband can be used as an alternative to
traditional telephone services. Through the Internet, broadband can help with both social
and professional networking. It is also a tremendously important source of information.
This information can vary widely from news, to job postings, to information on hobbies.
Increased information lowers search costs, and potentially leads to better matches in jobs,

“… much of the post-2000 gains reflect faster TFP growth in industries that were the most intensive users
of information technology.”
9
They define advanced Internet technology as “frontier applications such as e-commerce or e-business, as
opposed to basic applications like e-mail or web browsing.”
10
Note also that this paper focuses on effects at the county level; hence, relative to papers on skill-biased
technological change, this paper is not able to determine whether advanced Internet technology usage
affects high- versus low-skilled occupations and cannot determine how wage distributions change within a
given community.
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goods, services, community activities, and dating.11 Broadband increases the geographic
market for goods and services.12 It can also be used for gaming and entertainment.13

3. What are our goals?
The Congressional goals set forward in the Broadband Technology Opportunities
Program (Title VI. Sec. 6001) are to:


provide broadband access to unserved areas;



improve broadband access to underserved areas;



improve access and usage by public safety agencies; and



increase broadband access, education, training, and support to:
o schools, libraries, medical and healthcare providers, educational
institutions and community organizations;
o low-income, unemployed, aged, and otherwise vulnerable populations;
and
o strategically chosen facilities.

This program provides grants for broadband deployment through the NTIA and
RUS, and mandates that the FCC create a National Broadband Plan by February 17,
2010. The primary goal of the plan is “… to ensure that all people of the United States
have access to broadband capability and shall establish benchmarks for meeting that
goal.” The plan must focus on:


ensuring availability to the entire population;



achieving affordability and maximum adoption;



assessment of both deployment and the progress of projects supported by program
grants; and

11

Forman, Ghose, and Goldfarb (2009).
Arora and Gambardella (2005) and OECD (2006) examine lowered costs of retail shopping for isolated
consumers and Stevenson (2006) studies job searches.
13
Goolsbee and Klenow (2006) estimate large consumer welfare gains from the Internet, using wage data
to proxy for the opportunity cost of people‟s time.
12
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using broadband to enhance “… consumer welfare, civic participation, public
safety and homeland security, community development, health care delivery,
energy independence and efficiency, education, worker training, private sector
investment, entrepreneurial activity, job creation and economic growth, and other
national purposes.”

The FCC is currently working hard to create the National Broadband Plan. As
part of that process, it has been holding numerous workshops (29 in total) on topics
relevant to the plan and has created a website www.broadband.gov to facilitate
communication with the FCC on broadband issues. The FCC has also issued a Notice of
Inquiry to solicit comments on broadband issues.

Important Issues for the National Broadband Plan

Among the key difficulties in creating a National Broadband Plan are:


Definitional issues:
o Should we define broadband based on speed? Latency? Applications?
This may seem to be a trivial question, but it is tremendously difficult
since whatever definitions are chosen will affect which technologies might
be considered as broadband or not.

If some technologies are not

considered as providing broadband, this will affect whether a region is
deemed unserved or underserved. For example, if the definition has a
minimum latency requirement, then satellite will not be able officially to
provide broadband. Or if the definition of the minimum speed required to
be considered broadband is sufficiently high, then mobile broadband
might not qualify. Whatever the final definition, it will not only determine
what technologies, but also, what regions might be able to qualify for any
possible future grants/subsidies.
o Should we define unserved and underserved areas based on
availability? Speed? Adoption/usage?

- 13 -

If the definition is based on

consumer usage rather than availability, then resources would need to be
focused on demand factors over supply factors.


Data limitations: Based on the old form 477 data, we have limited information as
to the full availability of broadband in the nation. With the new form 477 data we
will have much better data, but it is still at the somewhat aggregative level of
census tracts (which can be extremely large in rural states), is still based on
subscribership (and hence is only a proxy for availability) and is still sufficiently
recent that the level of reporting errors are likely to be high.

The FCC is

gathering as much data as possible, from as many sources as possible. However,
given the current state of available data, it is unlikely that the FCC will have full
information as to the exact locations of all unserved and underserved areas before
the February 2010 deadline for the National Broadband Plan.


Choosing appropriate benchmarks: The plan will likely set certain goals. What
these goals will be is still being determined. Whatever they turn out to be, they
will need to have quantifiable benchmarks. This will then allow the FCC to
measure any future progress towards the goals stated in the National Broadband
Plan.



Interventions: Deciding if and where government intervention might be needed,
both on the deployment side and on the adoption side. The literature on the
determinants of broadband penetration and broadband adoption is limited but can
provide some guidance.



Funding: The Universal Service Fund (USF) is already requiring over $8 billion
in taxes every year. If this fund is to be used to provide support for broadband,
will the FCC reform the current USF, or will it seek other sources of funding for
any programs/initiatives/subsidies that it might suggest in the National Broadband
Plan.



Prioritization: Given the multiple goals that were put forth by Congress and also
given the agency‟s limited resources, should the FCC prioritize areas that are
underserved based on availability or based on adoption by consumers?

- 14 -

4. How do we best achieve these goals? What are the determinants of

broadband deployment and adoption?
Given the goals of availability for the entire U.S. population, deployment is at
issue. Given the goal of maximizing adoption, consumer demand is at issue. Existing
literature on the determinants of broadband penetration and consumer demand are
therefore relevant to policymakers when considering these goals.

Determinants of Broadband Penetration

Firm entry into a market is influenced by both demand and cost variables. On the
demand side, income, market size and composition, commuting distance, age, gender,
and education of population are among those shown to affect broadband penetration.14
On the cost side, population density, the quality of existing telecommunications
(including cable) infrastructure, fixed costs of deployment (affected by rural location,
topography, etc.) are among the relevant cost determinants for broadband penetration.15
A few papers have analyzed competition, and as importantly, types of
competition, as factors influencing overall broadband penetration. Studying 14 European
countries in 2001, 2002, and 2004, Distaso, Lupi, and Manenti (2006) find that the
number of access lines that had been upgraded to broadband depended primarily on
intermodal/inter-platform competition.

Similarly to Prieger and Lee (2008), they

additionally find that lower unbundling prices for the local loop also increase broadband
uptake (and the effect is greater when there is more inter-platform competition).16 The
key intuition from their paper is that while competition between DSL firms (through
unbundling) can promote “…broadband diffusion, this effect seems to be completely

14

Prieger and Hu (2008a) find that once income is controlled for, race does not appear to be a determinant
in supply of broadband in the U.S.
15
Prieger (2003), Prieger and Lee (2008), and Prieger and Hu (2008a).
16
Prieger and Lee (2008) use the Form 477 data to show that areas with lower rates for unbundled network
elements (UNEs) are correlated with more broadband availability. Although their results are statistically
significant, the magnitudes of the effects are small.
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overwhelmed by the negative „indirect‟ effect of increased inter-platform concentration
induced by promoting entry into the DSL segment of the market.”17
Denni and Gruber (2006) examine FCC data from 1999-2004 and find that U.S.
states with greater inter-platform competition have low initial availability of broadband,
but have faster rate of penetration/diffusion (i.e., growth in subscribership/population).
States with greater intra-platform competition (whether intra-cable or intra-DSL) showed
higher initial levels of broadband subscribership but a slower rate of penetration. They
found a similar result for States with a higher market share of “competitive local
exchange carriers (CLECS).
Determinants of Broadband Adoption
On the demand side, factors such as education, income, age, networking
opportunities, owning a computer, and price greatly influence adoption by individuals for
whom broadband is available.18 While many have focused on price as a key factor that
drives (or impedes) adoption by consumers, it appears from several Pew Internet Project
surveys that for the average individual who does not have broadband, price is not the
primary deterrent. The most recent April 2009 Pew Internet Project Survey found that 63
percent of adult Americans use broadband and 7 percent use dial-up. The most common
reason (cited by 50 percent of dial-up and non-internet users) for not using broadband
was that the Internet was not relevant to them. Only 19 percent cited price. Seventeen
percent said it was not available where they live, and 13 percent cited usability. The
survey also found that certain demographic groups such as senior citizens, low-income
Americans, and rural Americans had rapid growth in home broadband adoption from
2008 to 2009. However, African Americans experienced a second consecutive year of
below-average growth in broadband adoption.19 Prieger and Hu (2008b) have studied
adoption rates and find that even controlling for income and education, race remains as a
factor that affects demand for broadband services. They find that a lack of competition is
an important factor for African Americans and service quality is an important general

17

Distaso, Lupi, and Manenti (2006, p. 102).
Flamm, Chaudhri, and Horrigan (2005), Flamm and Chaudhri (2007), and Prieger and Hu (2008b).
19
Horrigan (2009).
18
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determinant of demand, but particularly so for Hispanics.

Social and professional

network effects may also play a role for demand from specific demographic groups.

Broadband Conclusion
The existing broadband research suggests that the importance of broadband is real
and quantifiable. The gains from broadband do not, however, appear to be evenly spread
across firms, industries, regions, or individuals.

Consequently, policies that target

specific regions may not have the desired economic impacts if those regions do not have
complementary characteristics. The value to individuals is perhaps harder to quantify,
but is nonetheless significant. The goal of reaching the entire population is dependent not
only on broadband availability but also on adoption on the part of the individual. Price
does not appear to be the most important driver for a majority of those who do not
currently have broadband, so other demand side factors will need to be considered in the
National Broadband Plan if increased usage is a goal.
The goal of increasing availability focuses attention on a few areas, whereas the
goal of increasing consumer demand is more geographically spread. Goolsbee (2001)
proposes a model for the impact of different broadband subsidy types (consumer or
investment subsidies) based on a consumer‟s willingness to pay for broadband. In his
model, the presence of fixed costs for broadband deployment in unserved areas implies
that subsidies to consumers will attract marginal users who do not greatly value
broadband, whereas subsidies to investment in unserved markets would give access to
new consumers who value broadband more highly.
This result echoes the Pew Survey findings: Half of consumers who do not
currently have broadband at home state that the primary reason they don‟t is that they
simply do not find broadband to be valuable to them. For low income households, price
may be the primary deterrent. For those households, consumer subsidies could bring in
users who might value broadband highly, but were previously simply unable to pay for it.
Still the Pew Survey suggests that this is likely to hold for only 7% of the total U.S.
population. Hence, blanket consumer subsidies would be wasteful. Targeted consumer
subsidies, however, could potentially aid disadvantaged groups and help reduce the
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digital divide. Prieger and Hu (2008)‟s work suggests that even controlling for income,
there are racial components that affect adoption by certain households that are not likely
to be fully addressed through a price subsidy.
While Goolsbee‟s model makes a strong argument for favoring deployment in
currently unserved areas first because of the presence of high valuation consumers, it
does not take into account the potential impact of broadband on productivity, wages, and
output growth. From that perspective, rural areas are the regions likely to have the
smallest marginal gains in those dimensions from increases in broadband access. Hence,
depending on whether the priority is on the economic performance of the aggregate
economy, or on consumer welfare from the consumption of broadband services, the type
of intervention and the geographic location of that intervention will differ. It will further
be important for the National Broadband Plan to estimate the marginal cost of any
potential interventions, as well as any possible marginal gains from those interventions.
This is by no means an easy task.
One final complication, if intervention is deemed necessary, is the need to avoid
costly and inefficient duplication of fixed costs of deployment in areas that really cannot
support more than one provider. The experience of the exploding costs of the Universal
Service Fund is a testament to that risk. It is for this reason that many have suggested
using reverse auctions to determine any investment subsidies within a given market.
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II. Merger Review
The Commission has overlapping authority with the federal antitrust agencies to
review proposed mergers between telecommunications carriers. Most recent years have
seen applications by wireless carriers wishing to merge, and the past year was no
exception.20 The FCC approved, subject to conditions, two large mergers of providers of
mobile wireless services during the past year:

one between Verizon Wireless and

ALLTEL and another between Sprint Nextel and Clearwire. With each merger that is
approved, the stakes are raised for the next, for there are only four terrestrial mobile
telephony providers left with national footprints: AT&T, Sprint, T-Mobile, and Verizon.
The FCC has a broader purview than the antitrust agencies, since the
Communications Act instructs it to determine whether the merger will “serve the public
interest, convenience, and necessity” without defining these terms.21 Thus, to draw an
example from another industry that the FCC regulates, the Commission has freedom to
consider the impact of media consolidation on diversity of both viewpoint and ownership.
Even though the antitrust laws do not permit such grounds for seeking to block a merger.
In the wireless mergers, the FCC interpreted the public interest to be served by increased
wireless service footprints, expanded narrowband and broadband service offerings

20

Recent large mergers reviewed and approved (with conditions) by the FCC include AT&T and Cingular
(2004), Sprint and Nextel (2005), AT&T and Dobson (2007), and Verizon Wireless and RCC (2008).
21
See 47 U.S.C. §§ 214(a), 310(d). Another difference between merger review at the FCC and the antitrust
agencies is that while the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) must file suit to block a merger that otherwise
will be consummated, at the FCC the applicants “bear the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the proposed transaction, on balance, will serve the public interest.” See Memorandum
Opinion and Order and Declaratory Ruling, Applications of Cellco Partnership d/b/a Verizon Wireless and
Atlantis Holdings LLC for Consent to Transfer Control of Licenses, (“Verizon-ALLTEL Order”) FCC 08258, Federal Communications Commission, November 4, 2008, at 26, and Memorandum Opinion and
Order, Sprint Nextel Corp. and Clearwire Corp. Applications for Consent to Transfer Control of Licenses,
Leases, and Authorizations (“Sprint-Clearwire Order), FCC 08-259, Federal Communications
Commission, November 4, 2008, at 19.
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(particularly in rural areas), better service quality, lower costs (efficiencies), and more
vigorous competition, and evaluated the proposed mergers along these dimensions.22
Nonetheless, a large part of each merger review at the FCC is similar to that done
by the DoJ, which also reviews mergers between telecommunications carriers. Markets
are defined, and then the competitive impacts of the merger are assessed with a marketby-market examination of post-merger pro forma HHI levels, pro forma increases in the
HHI, and the amount of spectrum (a crucial input to provide service) that the combined
entity would control.

We discuss these in turn.

In markets where post-merger

concentration or ownership of spectrum is deemed too high, the companies are required
to divest the assets of one of the firms. We discuss problems that arose with asset
divestiture from a previous merger in Section III.
a. Market Definition
Market boundaries for wireless communications services need to be determined in
both product and geographical space. In other recent wireless mergers, the FCC had
defined the product market to be “mobile telephony services,” which includes mobile
voice and (narrowband) data services for residences and businesses.23 The FCC declined
to add wired telephony service to the market, arguing that insufficient evidence on
wireless substitution exists to justify treating wired and wireless telephony as close
substitutes. Satellite-based service was also excluded from the market definition, since
satellite service prices are significantly higher than terrestrial mobile telephony and

22

The FCC examined the implications of the merger for a host of other public interest issues, such as the
ability to roam, exclusive contracts and handset availability, network openness, E911, and universal
service. See Verizon-ALLTEL Order, section VIII, and Sprint-Clearwire Order, section VI.
23
See, for example, Verizon-RCC Order, 23 FCC Rcd at 12483-84.
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broadband services. However, for the new mergers, the product market was expanded to
include mobile broadband service.24
It may appear odd to include broadband data and voice communication in the
same product market, given that voice-only service is not likely to be a good substitute
for broadband data transmission.

However, the FCC chose not to define mobile

broadband as a separate market, to avoid defining the rapidly evolving market too
narrowly. If mobile broadband market shares had been separated for their own HHI
calculation, the number of markets in which the merging firms had a monopoly or large
degree of dominance would have been much larger than under the product market
definition used. Calculation of HHI captures a snapshot of a market at a specific point in
time (or an average of such points); given the rapid deployment of 3G and 4G networks,
the fear was that defining the product markets too narrowly would “thwart [these] and
future pro-competitive deals that take place in the context of rapidly evolving markets
and services.”25 This is in accord with Gual (2003) and others who warn against defining
emerging markets too narrowly, since doing so may interfere with innovation and longerrun economic efficiency.
Concerning geography, the FCC conducted analyses using both cellular market
areas (CMAs)26 and Component Economic Areas (CEAs),27 as it had done for previous

24

The Sprint-Clearwire merger was also evaluated with reference to the fixed broadband services product
market.
25
Verizon-ALLTEL Order, at 45.
26
The FCC delineated CMAs when it first granted spectrum licenses for cellular telephony service in the
1980s.
27
CEAs are defined by the U.S. Department of Commerce‟s Bureau of Economic Analysis, and are an
aggregation of counties based on commuting flows and common newspaper readership. See Kenneth P.
Johnson, Redefinition of the BEA Economic Areas http://www.csus.edu/indiv/j/jensena/sfp/ea_desc.htm.
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mergers. The former market definition is more of a supply-side measure,28 whereas
CEAs capture areas with a high degree of economic integration, and thus reflect areas in
which a consumer would want mobile service coverage.
b. Input market for spectrum
The FCC also examines the aggregate spectrum that the combined carriers would
hold in each geographic market. Spectrum is a necessary input to offer wireless service.
If insufficient spectrum is available for entrants or competitors of the merged company in
an area, competitors may not be able to offer service on a scale that disciplines the prices
of the dominant firm. Not all spectrum is suitable to offer mobile telephony and data
services, due to the physical properties and available equipment technology at various
frequencies. Also, licensing restrictions preclude the use of some bands for mobile
telephony and broadband service. Thus, at the time of each merger the FCC must
determine which bands it will include in the spectrum input market for its analysis.
While much bandwidth can be included in this market without controversy (e.g.,
spectrum licensed for cellular and PCS use), other bands are less straightforward. 29
Verizon and ALLTEL argued that the AWS-1 and BRS/EBS bands should also be
included in the spectrum input markets.30 Sprint Nextel and Clearwire argued that the
BRS/EBS bands should not be included. The applicants‟ differing positions reflect their
differing portfolios of spectrum holdings.

28

Verizon-ALLTEL hold little BRS/ESB

The CMAs determined the geographic extent of the original cellular service licenses and thus defined the
regions in which carriers could offer service. However, the initial license coverage has shaped the
evolution of demand as well, by creating an area in which consumers face a (usually) consistent set of
service choices. Later services, such as “personal communication services” (PCS), had licenses covering
larger service areas.
29
The relative non-controversial bands included in the market definition are the cellular, PCS, specialized
mobile radio (SMR), and 700 MHz bands, which together amount to about 200 megahertz.
30
The FCC designates different bands with names for purposes of licensing. AWS stands for Advanced
Wireless Service, BRS is Broadband Radio Service, and EBS is Educational Broadband Service.
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spectrum, thus reducing their “market share” if it is included, while Sprint-Clearwire held
the lion‟s share of those bands in many areas. The AWS-1 band is in transition, being
cleared of legacy (mostly non-mobile) governmental users so as to allow its use for
commercial wireless broadband service.

The BRS band is also in transition, with

previous users transitioning to a new band plan, which will clear the band for wireless
broadband use. The EBS band is licensed to educational users such as universities, who
often lease their spectrum to commercial providers. The FCC decided to include the
AWS-1 and part of the BRS bands in the input market, but not the EBS band. 31
However, only the amount of spectrum that has actually been cleared and is ready for
commercial use in the AWS and BRS bands in a market was included in the analysis,
which necessitated market-by-market scrutiny.
c. Competitive Analysis
The FCC has no bright-line thresholds that trigger the divestiture requirement in a
market. Instead, a two-part screen is used to indicate which markets require closer
competitive analysis. Such screening allows for much more efficient use of analytic
resources available at the FCC, which is important given the large number of markets that
are involved in mergers of major carriers. The idea behind the screens is that in a market
where the merger applicants hold little spectrum and have little market share, the merger
is unlikely to decrease significantly the competitiveness of the market, and it is not
necessary to expend scarce staff time on (for example) determining exactly which areas
within each market are served by the various competitors.32

31

Included were the 45 megahertz of the AWS-1 band and 55.5 megahertz of contiguous BRS spectrum.
Although licenses are awarded for geographic areas that are intended to be served as a complete market,
license holders do not always build out to the maximum extent possible, or that may still be doing so at any
32
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The initial screen is based on each market‟s HHI, and is a looser (i.e., allowing
more post-merger concentration) screen than that suggested by the antitrust agencies‟
Horizontal Merger Guidelines.33 To be marked for further review, a market must have a
post-merger HHI of greater than 2,800 accompanied by an increase in HHI of no more
than 100 points, or any post-merger HHI as long as HHI increases less than 250 points as
a result of the merger. Note that the threshold of 2,800 is between the HHI of three and
four firms with equal market shares but that the threshold of a 250 point increase would
catch even a six-to-five merger.34 Since the Sprint-Clearwire merger was for the purpose
of creating a new fixed broadband service (WiMAX), and since there was little overlap in
the broadband services already offered by the companies, the merger had virtually no
immediate impact on HHI, and this first screen had no bite.
The second screen is based on spectrum holdings. The FCC totals the spectrum in
which the applicants hold at least a 10 percent interest. If such aggregated spectrum is
greater than approximately one-third of the total available in the market, the market is
subjected to closer analysis.35

given time consequently, market-level competition indicia may overstate the effective competition in some
areas of the region.
33
The Horizontal Merger Guidelines (sec. 1.51) set “general standards” that the following mergers
“ordinarily require no further analysis”: mergers resulting in post-merger HHI of less than 1000, or postmerger HHI between 1000 and 1800 when accompanied by increases in HHI of less than 100 points, or
post-merger HHI above 1800 with increases in HHI of less than 50 points. See
http://www.usDoJ.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz_book/hmg1.html .
34
Such thresholds perhaps avoid penalizing the applicants for the outcomes of previous FCC decisions
regarding mergers and spectrum allocation that allowed much concentration in many markets, while at the
same time casting a finer net for increases in concentration due specifically to the merger. In previous
orders the FCC had determined that even with a national HHI of over 2900 the mobile telephony market
enjoys “generally effective competition”. See the AT&T-Cingular merger order, Memorandum Opinion &
Order, FCC 04-255, October 22, 2004, at 107.
35
The precise threshold depended on whether AWS-1 and BRS spectrum was cleared and available for
commercial use. In markets where neither was available the threshold was 95 megahertz, and where both
were fully available it was 145 megahertz (with two intermediate levels in other markets).
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In the Verizon-ALLTEL merger, 218 markets were caught by at least one of the
initial screens based on HHIs and spectrum holdings. Before the FCC issued its final
order on the merger, the applicants had already agreed with the DoJ to divest assets in
100 of these markets. The FCC analyzed the remaining 118 markets with multiple
metrics to attempt to ascertain the incentive and ability of competitors and entrants to
react to any attempts of the merged firm to exercise market power. Both unilateral and
coordinated effects were considered in the choice of data to analyze. In addition to the
statistics that were calculated for the screens, additional metrics included the number,
service coverage, market share, and spectrum holdings of rival service providers, and the
same for the subset of these that can offer national service.36 Rather than following a
decision rule based on some precise weighting or other transformation of these market
characteristics, the FCC sought to “balance these factors on a market-specific basis, and
consider the totality of the circumstances in each market.”37 In other words, the FCC in
the end performed the quantitative analysis but allowed itself to judge the results
qualitatively. Qualitative analysis, instead of blind adherence to rules based on static
indicia, is recommended by Pleatsikas and Teece (2001) and others. We return to this
issue below.
In nearly all of the markets so examined, the FCC found that there would be four
or more established competitors with the capacity to respond to attempts by the merged
carrier to raise prices. Ten markets were singled out for particular discussion in the
Verizon-ALLTEL Order, and the FCC required divestitures in five of these. The divested

36

Data for the calculation of market shares came from the National Resource Utilization Forecast database,
which tracks phone number usage by all telecommunications services providers and thus measures the
simple (head count) shares of subscribers, unweighted by revenue or minutes of use.
37
Verizon-ALLTEL order at 91.
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markets share the characteristic that the merger would have reduced the number of
effective competitors (excluding those with little market share or ability to expand) to
three or fewer, without an immediate prospect of large-scale entry. In the remaining five
markets, although the number of current competitors immediately post-merger with
nearly complete coverage of the market was less than four, in each case the incumbent
rivals had enough capacity and coverage so that they would be able to respond to
attempted dominance by the merged entity by expanding their market presence within a
reasonable period of time. The FCC took seriously the notion that market analysis
consists of more than merely counting firms currently in the market; potential entry
played a prominent role in the analysis.
In the Sprint-Clearwire merger, 43 markets were caught by the spectrum screen,
which triggered further analysis of those markets. However, the FCC concluded that it
was highly unlikely that the merger would lead to competitive harm in any markets. The
main factor underpinning this conclusion was that since Clearwire‟s service offerings
were still in an emergent phase, and because there was little overlap between the current
broadband offerings of Sprint-Nextel and Clearwire, the merger did not increase HHI in
any market or reduce the number of competitors with sufficient network coverage.
Furthermore, in the markets caught by the screen there were two-to-four other providers
with adequate footprint and capacity to compete effectively with the merged entity, plus
the presence of other licenses holders that represented significant potential entry in the
future.
d. Economic issues and questions for research
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The mergers suggest several areas in which more economic research would be
helpful.
i. Market definition in dynamic markets
An open question for research is exactly what is the best practical way for a
merger authority to define markets when technology, products, and tastes are quickly
changing.38 Traditional market definition analysis, based on whether a firm‟s price is
constrained by existing competitors, can give a “seriously misleading picture of
competitive relations”39 in dynamic markets with rapidly developing technology. Teece
and Coleman (1998), Evans and Schmalensee (2001), and Gual (2003) all advocate that
in dynamic high-tech markets the boundaries between markets should be set by analyzing
the degree of competition among technologies. These include potentially disruptive
technologies (such as broadband) that may show little current demand cross-elasticity
with more established services (such as voice service). That disruptive technologies can
change the boundaries of competition and alter or even reverse the results of traditional
merger analysis is formally demonstrated by Adner and Zemsky (2005).
Pleatsikas and Teece (2001) warn in particular against defining markets too
narrowly and point out that implementing a standard SSNIP test40 to define a market is
problematic when technology is rapidly changing, for in such markets customers often
care most about the rate of change in the price-to-performance ratio, rather than in the
price level alone.

In other words, firms in such markets compete on increasing

38

Gual (2003) tackles the issue of market definition in telecommunications markets directly.
Evans and Schmalensee (2001), p.20.
40
A Small but Significant and Non-transitory Increase in Price (SSNIP) test asks whether a hypothetical
monopolist could profitably impose a small increase in price. If sufficient numbers of buyers would switch
to alternative products or to suppliers at other locations such that the price increase is unprofitable, then the
market definition must be expanded to include at least some of those substitute products or locations.
39
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functionality just as much (and perhaps more so) as on price. Pleatsikas and Teece
(2001) argue that since mechanistic application of market definition rules (such as
SSNIP) in high technology industries will inevitably lead to overly narrow markets,
qualitative approaches should be pursued instead. They suggest examining the level of
innovative and competitive effort expended by firms to assess the competitiveness of a
market. Similarly, Evans and Schmalensee (2001) caution that the analysis of market
power in high-tech markets “cannot be a simple exercise in drawing boundaries and
computing shares”, but instead must consist of looking for potential innovative
competitors and future races for dominance in a market.
Thus, a consistent theme in the literature is that push-button application of static
market analysis should be traded for qualitative approaches involving more exercise of
the regulator‟s judgment. The FCC has followed that course to a certain extent.
However, it is unclear exactly how such notions should be operationalized to the
numerous,

relatively

small

geographic

markets

that

must

be

analyzed

in

telecommunications mergers. For example, there is no feasible way to assess the level of
competitive effort among competing technologies in a particular geographic market.
The above discussion leads naturally to Gual‟s (2003) call for a “broad view” of
potential suppliers, including all of those that own assets (perhaps yet undeveloped) that
could be used to create substitute services. The most apparent such asset is spectrum, but
other such assets would include technological and marketing capabilities, which are less
amenable to quantification. Further work on how to operationalize a qualitative approach
to merger analysis would be extremely helpful.
ii. Input markets for spectrum
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There are a number of issues that warrant further analysis regarding the spectrum
screen.41 Given that any indicia for a market reflect conditions a specific point in time,
what are good rules for when spectrum should be deemed available for use?

For

example, if certain bands are slated to be clear of legacy government users in one month,
it would seem appropriate to include that spectrum in the denominator when calculating
the fraction of spectrum that is controlled by the merging firms. But what if the spectrum
will not be cleared for a year? Where should the horizon be set? Authors such as Gual
(2003) contend that when technology is rapidly changing, longer horizons to assess the
potential response of competitive suppliers are appropriate. Or more fundamentally,
should anticipated new spectrum supply be included under any circumstances, given that
the FCC does not have any spectrum caps on total ownership in place to prevent the
merged entity from buying the licenses when they become available?
Several commenting parties also raised the issue of whether, since not all
spectrum is equally suitable for particular purposes, spectrum of different wavelengths
should be weighted differently in a spectrum screen.42 The FCC has not done so to date,
although Commissioner Michael Copps (who was later the interim chairman after
Chairman Kevin Martin stepped down on inauguration day and before Julius
Genakowsky assumed the chair on June 29, 2009) stated that he favored a proceeding to
“establish appropriate rules for valuing the relative desirability of different spectrum.”43
However, in such cases it is not clear that if (for example) spectrum at frequency x
allows the offering of twice as much service capacity (however measured) than does
41

Several commenters, including some academic economists filing white papers for interested parties, took
aim at the details and even the fundamental rationale for the spectrum screen. See, for example, Katz
(2008).
42
See, for example, the comments filed by Leap Wireless in the Verizon-ALLTEL merger proceeding.
43
Sprint-Clearwire Order, p. 59.
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frequency y, ceteris paribus, that x should be weighted as equal to twice y in a spectrum
screen.

The extent to which spectrum is substitutable with other inputs matters.

Engineers can design networks that use spectrum more or less intensely in an area, based
on the size of the cells and other factors. Thus, to at least some extent less suitable
spectrum can be paired with higher amounts of other inputs to offer service that is similar
to that in another area where so-called “beachfront” (i.e, highly efficient for the intended
purpose) spectrum is available.

Perhaps weighting the latter spectrum more is

appropriate if the ultimate cost of offering service is lower. However, given that the
value of the spectrum license is derived from the profits from the services it enables, one
would expect that less suitable spectrum would have a lower opportunity cost of use. If
spectrum were completely fungible and an efficient secondary market existed for trading
licenses, then one would expect that the user cost of spectrum would fully adjust to
account for quality differences. A lower user cost for lower quality spectrum levels the
playing field at least somewhat. However, to the extent that the spectrum license resale
market is not perfectly competitive, research is warranted to further explore the issues.
There are further issues regarding the spectrum screen: Two such issues are
where the ownership threshold should be set, and exactly which spectrum should be
included. Current practice assumes that spectrum can be controlled by a carrier if it owns
as little as a 10 percent interest in the license. Can economic theory, drawn from the
fields of contract and bargaining theory, or perhaps from the theories of joint ventures,
cooperative behavior, property rights, and ownership structure, or even common property
markets, suggest whether this is the appropriate threshold? An even more technical issue
involves the treatment of guard bands in the spectrum screen. A guard bands is a span of
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spectrum frequencies that is set aside as the electromagnetic equivalent of a demilitarized
zone, to avoid interference between transmissions on either side of the band. Guard
bands are not included in the amount of spectrum available or owned in a market in the
screen, which appears reasonable enough at first look. However, if the same carrier holds
the spectrum on both sides of the guard band, nothing (legally) prevents it from
combining the guard band with its use of the other spectrum. Further research would be
useful here to ascertain whether carriers are using spectrum in the guard bands in such
cases or whether there are technological reasons why the carriers would choose to leave
the guard bands intact.
iii. Competitive analysis
When the market is incorrectly defined, as discussed in Section 3.d.i, then any
subsequent analysis of HHI may be meaningless.

Even if markets are defined

appropriately, however, competitive analysis based on HHI raises other issues.
Exactly how should HHI be calculated? As described above, the FCC calculates
market shares as the fraction of lines served.

Given that consumers of mobile

telecommunications and broadband service buy not only access but also usage, it is not
clear that the share of access lines alone best captures how dominant a particular carrier is
in a market. Some commenting parties suggested weighting line counts by revenue or
minutes of usage. Would the benefits of gathering data on revenue, usage minutes, or
megabytes of data transmitted (in the case of mobile broadband) in improving the
competitive analysis outweigh the costs to the firms of providing the data? Unless the
customer profiles of carriers in a market differ widely (for example, firm A serves many
but low-volume residential users and firm B serves few but high-volume business
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accounts), we suspect that the costs to the firms of supplying the data make the endeavor
not socially beneficial, especially since part of the data gathering burden falls on other
firms in the industry apart from the merger applicants.
The question of what measure of market share should be used to analyze mergers
is a standard issue for antitrust enforcement, of course. In principle, we seek the measure
that best indicates the likelihood of coordinated effects among the firms. The best such
measure may vary from industry to industry, and it may be important to consider what
measures industry participants use when they monitor each other.44 Given that the
wireless carriers are likely not to have good estimates of their competitor‟s revenue or
minutes of usage at the local market level, perhaps it would make less sense to base the
HHI calculations on those measures than on subscriber counts. Additional research on
identifying when such additional data would be most likely to lead to a different outcome
for the competitive analysis would be helpful.
The coincidence of the two merger applications raises another issue:

Both

mergers were analyzed at the same time, but each competitive market analysis used
existing market and spectrum shares, which is tantamount to assuming that the “other”
merger would not take place. Given that legally each merger was to be evaluated on its
own merits, this is an understandable procedure. However, an interesting question arises
when evaluating simultaneous mergers: It is possible to imagine an outcome where
merger A would be approved in the absence of merger B but not if merger B were treated
as a fait accompli in the market analysis, and vice versa. In such cases, should the
regulatory decision rest merely on which application was filed a few days earlier? Or
should the regulator or antitrust authority undertake a more complete investigation than
44

We thank the editor for raising this point.
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usual, to determine not only if a merger would result in consumer harm but also to learn
which merger will benefit consumers more? We hasten to add that although the SprintClearwire and Verizon-ALLTEL mergers were not analyzed conditionally upon the other
merger‟s being approved, it most likely would not have changed the conclusions if they
were, given the largely complementary nature of Sprint Nextel‟s and Clearwire‟s premerger service offerings.
III. The AT&T/Dobson Case and Optimal Penalties
One recurring task at the FCC is the determination of penalties to be assessed for
violations of the Commissions rules or orders by a regulated firm.

Most of these

violations are instances of relatively common violations (e.g., the marketing of an
unauthorized wireless device or broadcasting outside of the parameters of a radio
station‟s license), raise no new issues, and can be penalized readily with reference to
previous cases.

However, at times violations become known that are novel in the

economic or legal issues they raise. One example is the penalty assessed against AT&T
for violations of conditions attached to the merger of AT&T and Dobson
Communications, a wireless service provider.45 In this case, AT&T was accused of
targeting former Dobson customers in certain markets with account acquisition practices
that violated the carrier‟s consent decree with the FCC. The case raises the interesting
question of what an appropriate penalty should be for such violations of a regulator‟s
orders, and how a theoretically optimal penalty can be determined practically.
e. Background

45

See Order and Consent Decree in the Matter of AT&T Inc., DA-09-26, Federal Communications
Commission, January 14, 2009.
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Due to concerns about the competitiveness of certain markets after the merger,
before approving the merger in 2007 the FCC required divestiture of Dobson‟s assets in
four wireless service markets in Kentucky, Oklahoma, and Texas. AT&T already had a
significant market presence in each of these markets. A trustee was appointed to manage
the divested assets until buyers were found. While AT&T retained temporary ownership
of the former Dobson assets until sale, the trustee was directed to employ the assets to run
an independent business that would compete against AT&T and other carriers in the
markets. AT&T was supposed to protect the confidentiality of all operating and
marketing information related to the divested assets. However, in March 2008 the FCC
received allegations that employees of AT&T accessed confidential customer sales files
(which typically include information such as pricing and contract renewal dates) and used
the data to try to win former Dobson customers over to AT&T in the divested markets. 46
The case, pursued by the Enforcement Bureau at the FCC, concluded with a consent
decree, under which AT&T agrees to pay a penalty of $2.38M but admits no wrongdoing and the FCC drops further inquiry into the case.47 The penalty was the third largest
assessed during July 2008-June 2009.
This case raises two interesting economic issues. First, what principles should
guide the determination of penalties? Second, how can the theoretical notions practically
be applied? With no claim that that the following discussion reflects how the penalty was
actually determined, we use the case at hand to illustrate these two issues.
46

Knowing a potential customer‟s past usage data and contract terms would enable a sales person to tailor a
service offering designed specifically to win the customer to AT&T. Knowing when a contract was ending
would further allow the sales staff to target the customer at the time of contract renewal, when it would be
most likely to switch carriers. Presumably the activity was directed at high-volume business accounts,
which gain the most revenue for wireless carriers.
47
Since the DOJ also approved the merger, subject to divestiture of three of the same four markets the FCC
required, the DOJ undertook a parallel investigation, which also resulted in a consent decree and fine.
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f. The Economics of Optimal Penalties
Polinsky and Shavell (1998) set out the economic fundamentals of optimal
penalties when a firm engages in illegal activity. On the assumption that the goal of
penalizing the firm is deterrence (i.e., to provide incentives to the offending firm not to
repeat and to other firms not to engage in the illegal activity), optimal penalties align the
private incentives of a potential perpetrator with the social incentives. If punishment is
certain, then the optimally deterring penalty is equal to the harm that the act creates for
the rest of society. When it is not certain that punishment will follow an illegal act,
because (for example) detection is uncertain, the optimally deterring penalty is marked up
to restore incentives in expected value.
The harm from the action is measured as its external cost, net of any benefits,
imposed on the economy. The external cost excludes the private costs and benefits of the
perpetrator, which the firm already takes into account when making its decisions and
which need not be included in the penalty.48 The following relationship makes this
notion definite:
Harm = PSR + CS) + H

(1)

where  means “change in” caused by perpetration of the act, PSR is the producer surplus
of the potentially offending firm‟s rivals, CS is consumer surplus in the affected markets,
and H includes any other harms to social welfare that can be quantified. With the penalty
thus defined, the firm faces the socially appropriate price of committing the illegal act. If
the penalty is smaller than the amount of the harm, then the price of transgression is too
low, and the firm will commit the act in some cases when (from the standpoint of the
48

This is in contrast to 47 C.F.R. sec. 1.80, which lists “substantial economic gain” to the perpetrator as
one of the “upward adjustment criteria” for FCC penalties (see section II of note to paragraph (b)(4)
therein).
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social calculus) it should not. In cases where firms can take costly internal measures to
prevent illegal conduct, efficiency also requires not setting overly large penalties. An
inefficiently high penalty causes the firm to overinvest in avoidance.49 In summary: an
optimally deterring penalty aligns the firm‟s private calculus with the social
consequences of the transgression and gives firms the correct incentives for preventive
behavior.
When punishment is uncertain, the optimal penalty is set so that the perpetrating
firm will pay on average for the harm it causes. 50 When the chance of discovery and
assessment of a penalty is low, the penalty must be set higher to ensure that the firm‟s
expected penalty cost equals the harm. Marking up (1) to account for the probability of
detection and punishment, p, accomplishes this goal:
Optimal penalty = Harm/p.

(2)

g. Practical implementation of optimal penalties
Discussing the theory in light of the alleged AT&T infractions illuminates both
the promise and difficulties of practical implementation. We emphasize again that the
following exercise is meant to illustrate the economic approach to penalizing the firm,
and does not necessarily reflect the Commission‟s reasoning, which was not released.
The first practical problem with the economic approach is that it is
counterintuitive to the way some regulatory officials, who are typically trained as
lawyers, think about penalties. Notable by its absence in the optimal penalty is the
appropriation of illicitly gained profit.

The profit accruing to the firm from the

transgression does not appear in the penalty; because it is a private benefit, the firm
49

If there is no cost to the firm of deciding not to transgress (i.e., the firm can ensure that no transgression
occurs without using any resources), then an overly large penalty bears no welfare cost.
50
This discussion presumes the firm is risk neutral.
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already included it in its calculations. This neatly sidesteps the difficult question of
calculating the illicitly gained profit of the firm. However, in such a case a lawyer may
think first of the doctrine of unjust enrichment and seek to penalize the firm to remove
any advantage gained by its illicit actions. This may reflect an underlying difference in
goals, where punishment is sought instead of deterrence. Economists may have little
guidance to give on the subject of punishment for its own sake, divorced from the goal of
deterrence, since by definition such punishment is the repayment of a sunk social cost
and does not affect any economic agent‟s future decisions.
If deterrence is the goal and the economic approach is to be followed, then the
next steps are to answer the following questions to determine the social harm and arrive
at an optimal penalty for AT&T in this case:
1. What is the impact on the rival‟s profits from AT&T‟s actions?
2. What is the impact on consumer welfare?
3. What is the probability of discovery and penalty?
We address these in turn.
i. The impact on the rival‟s profits
Although the precise nature of allegations were not released, from the information
in the consent decree it is reasonable to assume that employees of AT&T tried to “poach”
customers from the former Dobson accounts by making use of account data that were offlimits after divestiture.51 Hereafter we call the alleged victim “TrustCo” as shorthand for
the business concern that was using the divested assets, managed by the trustee, intended
to be sold to another wireless carrier.
51

For example, knowing the details of a legacy Dobson contract with a subscriber, including when it was
up for renewal, would enable AT&T salespeople to craft customized marketing pitches to induce highvolume customers (such as business accounts) to switch to AT&T.
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To know the impact on TrustCo‟s profit we must begin with determining how
many customers AT&T poached.

One could proceed with a criminal investigative

approach: The evidence in the case can be examined to determine how many clear and
convincing episodes of illegal customer poaching there were. The obvious defect in this
approach is that probably only the tip of the iceberg is visible, and many cases of
poaching may remain undiscovered.
An econometric approach is an alternative. Since AT&T and Dobson competed
before the merger and divestiture in these markets, the pre- and post-merger competitive
environments may not be dissimilar in the short run. In particular, both before and after
the merger, in the markets at issue AT&T competed against Dobson (pre-merger) or
TrustCo (post-merger) for the same group of customers. Thus, holding other factors
affecting churn constant, the pre-merger period could be used to establish an estimated
number of customers that under normal circumstances the rival would have expected to
lose to AT&T.
The key data needed for such a calculation are the churn rates between the two
companies in the affected markets, and perhaps also for other companies in these markets
to use as controls, for a period spanning the onset of the illicit behavior. Such data can be
requested from the carriers as part of the investigation or gleaned from industry
databases.52 If we only compare the average number of lines porting from Dobson to
AT&T before and after the merger, then we cannot control for general market trends that
have nothing to do with the transgression. A better approach would make use of the
52

The Commission has data from NeuStar‟s local number portability database that records how many
wireless numbers are ported from one carrier to another (“number ports”) in each market every month.
Number ports are a good proxy for the number of customers switching carriers. Although a count of ports
does not include customers who want a new phone number when they switch, the approximation is likely to
be good for business customers, who likely wish to keep their existing phone numbers.
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technique of differences in differences (D-D). In a D-D approach, the change over time
in porting to AT&T is compared between Dobson and other carriers. The D-D estimate
of poaching is the change in the amount of porting from Dobson/TrustCo after the
merger, net of the similar change for the other carriers in the same markets. Thus, the
effects of common trends affecting all carriers equally over time are removed.53
The next step is to place a welfare value on a line poached. An ideal approach
would require knowing TrustCo‟s incremental cost and revenue of serving each poached
customer. Lacking such data, a proxy for the average incremental profit gained from
each line can be constructed as follows. Dobson‟s service revenue (excluding roaming
revenue) per subscriber at the time was $52.54.54 Dobson‟s “network and other operating
costs” per customer per month is $14.08.55 These costs do not include marketing and
advertising, which are not subscriber-specific. They may not include all subscriberspecific incremental costs, however, because they lead to a relatively high difference of
$38.46 as a proxy for marginal profit per subscriber-month. Another estimate is $29.35,
taken from “operating cash flow before marketing” (based on EBITDA).56 The midpoint
between these two estimates, $34, can be taken as a compromise proxy for incremental
per-line profit. The proxy is necessarily rough, because the incremental economic profit
of a poached line will not exactly match these estimates of accounting profits for an
average line.

53

When the scale of porting differs widely among carriers, the dependent variable can either be expressed
in percentage terms or a Poisson regression with adjustment for exposure can be used to account for
different number of accounts “at risk” for porting. See Winkelmann (2008), sec. 3.1.5, on the Poisson
approach.
54
UBS Investment Research, US Wireless 411, 3 June 2008, p.30. Figure is for 3Q2007.
55
Dobson Communications Corp., SEC Form 10-Q, dated September 30, 2007, filed with the SEC
November 9, 2007. Taken from Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. Figure is for 3Q2007.
56
UBS Investment Research, op. cit., p.46. Figure is for 3Q2007
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Given a value of $34 per line per month to TrustCo, the approximate expected
present value of losing the customer is the present value of the monthly incremental profit
received until month T, where T is the remaining lifetime of a typical Dobson customer.
For T, we calculate the lifetime of a typical Dobson customer to be the reciprocal of the
churn rate (2.6%/month), which is 38.5 months.57 However, on average the customer
would have been through half of its life already,58 and so we set T = 19. The approximate
present value of a lost subscriber line is therefore $620.38. The present value calculation
assumes a discount factor of 6.3%, taken from the rate on bonds that AT&T issued in
December 2007.59 Multiplying the per-line amount by the D-D estimate of lines poached
yields a present value estimate of PSR.
ii. The impact on consumer welfare.
The other major component of harm comes from reductions in consumer surplus.
Note that revealed preference arguments suggest that consumer surplus is increased by
the illegal activity, at least in the short run.60 If the high-volume business customers
likely to be targeted for poaching are well-informed about their options for wireless
service, then if they switched to AT&T from TrustCo it was because it was in their
interest to do so. Apparently, the prices, perceived service quality, or terms of contract

57

Dobson‟s churn rate is for post-paid subscribers, and is from their SEC Form 10-Q, op. cit. Using the
reciprocal of the churn rate to estimate total subscriber lifetime is done in UBS Investment Research, op.
cit., and is theoretically justified by appealing to the exponential lifetime distribution (for which expected
lifetime is the reciprocal of the hazard rate).
58
Again, we assume an exponential lifetime distribution for simplicity.
59
One could alternatively use some estimate of a social discount rate.
60
There may be longer-term considerations regarding consumer surplus, as in the case of predatory pricing
theory: Although business customers benefit now from AT&T‟s lower prices, they will have to pay higher
prices in the future if the firm‟s actions lessen competition in the market. To the extent that any such harm
happens, it is necessarily in the future, and its present value may be small. There may be other factors that
invalidate the revealed preference argument even in the short term, such as principal-agent problems or
inefficient procurement policies within the customer‟s firm.
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were more attractive than what they had before. We thus would need to subtract these
consumers‟ gains from the social harm, and therefore from the penalty.
In the absence of sufficient data to estimate a complete demand system for
wireless services by these customers, the size of the benefits gained by subscribers from
switching must be approximated. In principle, as long as the minutes of use do not
change much after the switch to AT&T, the approximate change in consumer surplus is
the difference between the revenue the customer paid to TrustCo and the revenue paid to
AT&T after switching. This approximation will be more inaccurate when the minutes of
use changes after the switch are greater.
We have no data on the revenue of customers who switched carriers, and looking
at differences between (pre-merger) Dobson and AT&T in the average revenue gained
from business customers is likely to reflect mainly differences in the composition of
business customers served by the two carriers. However, given that the consumer surplus
of a poached customer is not being entirely destroyed, unlike the total loss of profit to
TrustCo from a poached account, we expect that CS is of only second order importance
compared to PSR in (1).61
iii. The impact on other aspects of social welfare
Another factor in social welfare that is possibly affected by the transgression is
the devaluation of the licenses and assets held by TrustCo that were to be sold. If
potential buyers of the licenses recognize that an appropriate scheme of optimal penalties
is in place, much of the market value of the license will be restored. Furthermore, to the
61

Another component of social welfare perhaps affected by the transgression may come from any
devaluation of the licenses and assets held by TrustCo that were to be sold. To the extent that the license
and assets derive their value from the flow of profits that they enable, there is no need to add any
devaluation into the harm calculation, because the lost profit of the rival has already been priced into the
penalty.
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extent that the license does drop in value, it is because of the lost profit of the rival, which
has already been priced into the penalty.
iv. What is the probability of discovery and penalty?
The final piece of information required to calculate the optimal penalty is the
probability that AT&T is penalized. The quantity we seek is the probability per act, so
that a penalty per act can be determined. Since it is natural to think that upon discovery,
AT&T knew with certainty that it would face specific consequences from the FCC, the
question simplifies to: What was the probability that AT&T‟s illegal customer
acquisitions would be discovered?62 While the precise determination of quantity p in
equation (2) is impossible to achieve, an estimate can be constructed from the details of
the case. The longer that the illegal activity went on and the larger was the number of
customers illegally acquired before discovery, the lower would be the likely value of p.
To estimate the probability p of detection of a successful illegal customer
acquisition, one can take a Bayesian approach and treat detection as a Bernoulli random
variable for each act, with unknown probability of “success” (detection). An investigator
in such a case can begin with the estimates of how many customers were poached and
approximate how many illegal acquisitions occurred before the activity was detected. If
there are N illegal acquisitions by the time of detection, then the “sample” of Bernoulli
random variables has N-1 “failures” and one “success”. Using an uninformative uniform
prior for the probability of detection, the Bayesian posterior mean of the detection
probability is 2/(2+N). This can be used for p in the penalty formula. Given that the
FCC did not begin its investigation until four months after the merger, it is likely that N
62

Here we are setting aside the principal-agent nature of the problem by treating the firm as a unified
decision maker; we would expect that the firm would claim that the illegal activity came from rogue sales
staff.
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could be sizeable, and that the probability of detection was low. A low probability of
detection leads to a large penalty, given that p is in the denominator of the optimal
penalty.
h. Other Issues in Implementation
Once the elements of equation (2) have been estimated, calculating the optimal
penalty is straightforward.

Although we cannot complete the calculation with the

publicly available data, we hope that the procedure outlined above proves useful for
economists working on similar enforcement cases in the future. There is a larger issue to
be addressed before leaving the topic, however. The penalties suggested by Polinsky and
Shavell (1998) are optimally deterring only if firms in the regulated industry know that
the regulator is committed to levying them when violations come to light.

A full

discussion of regulatory commitment is beyond the scope of this article.63

If the

principles guiding the calculation of penalties is not made known to industry, or if the
optimal penalties are merely used as the starting point for negotiations, then the resulting
impact on firms‟ incentives to violate the rules may be far from optimal.64

IV.

Conclusion

These are interesting times for economists at the FCC. On the one hand, the
opportunity to help shape the National Broadband Plan calls for vision, the ability to
synthesize lessons from the academic literature on broadband for the policymakers, and
the ability to take (and communicate) a grand view of an important and wide ranging

63

See Spiegel and Spulber (1997) for a discussion of why it is often unrealistic to assume that regulators
can credibly commit to policies.
64
The ability to commit to an enforcement framework of optimal penalties may be hampered by existing
limitations on penalties. For example, federal stature proscribes penalties in excess of certain amounts,
depending on the industry of the infringer and the category of the violation. See 47 C.F.R. sec. 1.80.
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policy topic. On the other hand, the daily life of the agency continues, in which attention
must be paid to the smallest (but nevertheless important) details of merger analysis and
other regulatory "business as usual". Economists working at the FCC have the pleasant
opportunity of both serving the public interest and being presented with intriguing
opportunities where further economic research is vitally needed.
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Appendix

Table A1.
Percentage of U.S. Zip Codes with High-Speed Lines in Service
(June of Each Year)

# of Providers 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Zero
33.0 22.2 16.1
9.0
5.7
2.0
0.7
0.1
0.0
One
25.9 20.3 18.4 16.4 13.8
9.3
3.7
0.9
0.3
Two
17.8 16.7 16.2 16.9 16.8 14.1
8.2
3.6
1.5
Three
9.2 13.2 13.3 14.0 14.9 15.0 11.3
7.0
3.7
Four
4.9
8.2
9.6 10.6 11.6 12.6 12.9 11.1
7.2
Five
3.4
4.9
6.9
7.7
8.4
9.7 12.2 13.6 10.8
Six
2.5
3.6
4.6
5.3
6.1
6.8 10.4 13.0 13.4
Seven
1.7
2.8
3.2
4.0
4.4
5.3
8.7 11.6 12.7
Eight
0.8
2.2
2.8
3.1
3.6
4.0
7.1
9.1
9.9
Nine
0.4
1.9
2.4
2.5
2.8
3.8
5.8
7.4
7.4
Ten or More
0.4
3.9
6.4 10.5 11.8 17.5 19.1 22.7 33.2
Source: FCC (2009). Until 2005, only those providers with at least 250 lines per state were
required to file Form 477. Figures may not add up to 100% due to rounding.
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